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a b s t r a c t 
The use of algorithms in modern data processing techniques, as well as data-intensive tech- 
nological trends, suggests the adoption of a broader view of the data protection impact as- 
sessment. This will force data controllers to go beyond the traditional focus on data quality 
and security, and consider the impact of data processing on fundamental rights and collec- 
tive social and ethical values. 
Building on studies of the collective dimension of data protection, this article sets out 
to embed this new perspective in an assessment model centred on human rights (Human 
Rights, Ethical and Social Impact Assessment-HRESIA). This self-assessment model intends 
to overcome the limitations of the existing assessment models, which are either too closely 
focused on data processing or have an extent and granularity that make them too compli- 
cated to evaluate the consequences of a given use of data. 
In terms of architecture, the HRESIA has two main elements: a self-assessment ques- 
tionnaire and an ad hoc expert committee. As a blueprint, this contribution focuses mainly 
on the nature of the proposed model, its architecture and its challenges; a more detailed 
description of the model and the content of the questionnaire will be discussed in a future 
publication drawing on the ongoing research. 
© 2018 Alessandro Mantelero. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
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(. Introduction 
isk assessment models today play an increasing role in data 
rotection, as recently confirmed by the EU General Data Pro- 
ection Regulation (hereinafter GDPR).1 Various types of as- 
essment models can be adopted: they may be mandatory or 
oluntary, self-assessments or third-party/licensing schemes.
hey can only assess specific kinds of data processing or types 
f risk. They may be risk/benefit assessments or rights-based ∗ Corresponding author: Department of Management and Productio
orino 10120, Italy. 
E-mail address: alessandro.mantelero@polito.it 
1 See Articles 25 and 26, GDPR. 
i
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2018.05.017 
267-3649/© 2018 Alessandro Mantelero. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This
 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) ssessments. Finally, they may only focus on the legal issues 
r encompass societal issues as well. 
Against this background, the first question we need to ask 
hen defining an assessment model is whether the model is 
o be sector-specific or general. This is an important question,
ince data uses are not circumscribed by a specific domain or 
echnology. 
It hardly seems possible to adopt a technology-specific ap- 
roach, for example, an IoT impact assessment, a Big Data 
mpact assessment, a smart city impact assessment or an AI n Engineering, Politecnico di Torino, C.so Duca degli Abruzzi, 24, 
 is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
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7 See Alessandro Mantelero, ‘Personal data for decisional pur- 
poses in the age of analytics: from an individual to a collective 
dimension of data protection’ in this Review (2016), vol 32, issue 2, 
238–255; Alessandro Mantelero, ‘The future of consumer data pro- 
tection in the E.U. Rethinking the ‘notice and consent’ paradigm 
in the new era of predictive analytics’ in this Review (2014), vol 30, 
issue 6, 643–660. See also Alessandro Mantelero, ‘Regulating Big 
Data. The guidelines of the Council of Europe in the Context of the 
European Data Protection Framework’ in this Review (2017), vol 33, 
issue 5, 584-602. 
8 See Mantelero, ‘The future of consumer data protection in 
the E.U.’ (n 7), p. 654–659. See also David Wright, ‘A framework 
for the ethical impact assessment of information technology 
(2011) 13(3) Ethics and Information Technology 199–226; Paul 
M. Schwartz, ‘Data Protection Law and the Ethical Use of An- 
alytics’ Data Protection Law and the Ethical Use of Analytics’ 
(The Centre for Information Policy Leadership, 2011) < http:// 
www.informationpolicycentre.com/uploads/5/7/1/0/57104281/ 
data _ protection _ law _ and _ the _ ethical _ use _ of _ analytics _ _ paul _ impact assessment.2 All these technologies use data process-
ing for decision-making: they differ in their methods but not
in their scope. For this reason, and because the rights and val-
ues to be safeguarded are the same in these different con-
texts - regardless of the technology used, the model proposed
here is not a technological assessment,3 but a rights-based
and values-oriented model. 
In the context of data-driven applications, an assessment
focused on a specific technology looks to be inadequate and
only partially effective.4 On the other hand, taking into ac-
count the various application domains (e.g. healthcare or
crime prevention), different sets of rights, freedoms and val-
ues should be considered. So, a sector-specific approach fo-
cuses on the rights and values in question rather than the
technology. 
Thus, sectoral models concentrate their attention, not on
the technology, but on the context and the values that assume
relevance in that context.5 This does not mean that the nature
of the technology has no importance in the assessment pro-
cess as a whole: a given technology determinates the most ap-
propriate measures to take to safeguards the benchmark val-
ues. 
Adopting a value-oriented approach, the assessment
should focus on the societal impact of data use. This impact
encompasses the potential negative outcomes on a variety of
fundamental rights and principles and also takes into account
the ethical and social consequences of data processing.6 
In addressing these issues, this article builds on the results
of previous research on data protection regulation in the con-
text of data-intensive applications for decision-making pro-
cesses. These works point out the criticisms affecting data
protection in this context – which is dominated by an exten-
sive use of Big Data analytics, algorithms and AI – and suggest
the development of broader forms of data protection impact2 See AI Now Institute, ‘Algorithmic Impact Assessments: To- 
ward Accountable Automation in Public Agencies’ (2018) < https:// 
medium.com/@AINowInstitute/algorithmic- impact- assessments- 
toward- accountable- automation- in- public- agencies- bd9856e6fdde > 
accessed 4 March 2018. 
3 See Barbara Skorupinski and Konrad Ott, ‘Technology assess- 
ment and ethics’ (2002) 1(2) Poiesis & Praxis 95–122. 
4 In some cases, it is hard to define the borders between the dif- 
ferent data processing fields and the granularity of the subject 
matter (e.g. the blurred confines between well-being devices/apps 
and medical devices). 
5 Specific impact assessments for Big Data analytics and for AI 
are not necessary, but we do need separate impact assessments for 
data-driven decisions in healthcare and another for smart cities, 
given the different values underpinning the two sectors. Whereas, 
for example, civic engagement and participation and equal treat- 
ment will be the driving values behind smart city technologies 
impact assessment, in healthcare freedom of choice and no-harm 
principle may play a more critical role. Differing contexts have dif- 
ferent “architectures of values” that should be taken into account 
as a benchmark for the assessment models. 
6 See also Skorupinski and Ott (n 3) 101 (“Talking about risk […] is 
not possible without ethical considerations […] when it comes to 
a decision on whether risk is to be taken, obviously an orientation 
on norms and values is unavoidable”). assessment, which also looks at the social impact and encour-
age a values-oriented use of data.7 
In an initial approach, a mandatory multiple impact as-
sessment was suggested to address these issues in an attempt
to provide stronger safeguards for individuals.8 However, a
mandatory procedure encompassing societal issues was per-
ceived as excessively burdensome and complex by business.
This article therefore reconsiders the nature of the assess-
ment and recommends a voluntary model,9 which retains
data controllers’ freedom of decision, making this assessment
a more acceptable solution than compulsory provisions. 
Furthermore, a voluntary approach is more consistent with
the existing legal framework, which seems to have difficulties
in going beyond mere data protection in information use. In
this sense, the GDPR – which provides one of the most ad-
vanced examples of regulation in this area – focuses on riskschwartzwhite _ paper _ 2010 _ .pdf> accessed 18 December 2017. 
9 An important contribution in refining this proposal came from 
the Guidelines on Big Data issued by the Council of Europe in 
2017, where a focus on the ethical and social consequences 
of data use was adopted by the members of the Consultative 
Committee of the Convention for the protection of individuals 
with regard to automatic processing of personal data. However, 
the discussion, which also engaged representatives of various 
stakeholders, outlined the difficulties in adopting a mandatory 
ethical and social assessment as part of the traditional data pro- 
tection assessment. See Council of Europe, ‘Guidelines on the pro- 
tection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data in a world of Big Data’, adopted in January 2017 and avail- 
able at < https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/ 
DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806ebe7a > accessed 
4 May 2017. Disclosure: the author had the privilege to be ap- 
pointed as consultant expert in drafting the text of the guidelines 
and to follow the discussion of the proposal by the representatives 
of the Parties to Convention 108 in the Bureau of the Consulta- 
tive Committee of Convention 108 and the Plenary Meeting. Con- 
cern about the mandatory nature of the proposed assessment and 
its consequences in terms of use of resources was also expressed 
by several commentators, some belonging to sectors of industry, 
during the presentation of my proposal on a mandatory assess- 
ment in the European workshop on “Algorithmic decision making 
and human rights implications” (Alexander von Humboldt Insti- 
tute for Internet and Society - Hans-Bredow-Institute for Media 
Research, Berlin 2017), the Amsterdam Privacy Conference (Ams- 
terdam, 2015) and the 9th International Conference on Legal, Se- 
curity and Privacy Issues in IT Law (Lisbon, 2014). 
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14 See, ex multis , Politico Staff, ‘Full text: Mark Zuckerberg’s 
Wednesday testimony to Congress on Cambridge Analytica’ 
Politico (9 April 2018) < https://politi.co/2GNxFLx > accessed 9 May 
2018; Llàcer, M. R., Casado, M., & Buisan, L. (eds), ‘Document on 
bioethics and Big Data: exploitation and commercialisation of user 
data in public health care’ (Barcelona, 2015); ProPubluca, series 
‘Machine Bias Investigating Algorithmic Injustice’ < https://www. 
propublica.org/series/machine-bias > accessed 30 April 2018. 
15 See, in this sense, the increasing propensity of the big ssessment, but it is still far from a mandatory model encom- 
assing societal issues. 
The EU legislator recognises data processing risks such as 
iscrimination and “any other significant economic or social 
isadvantage”,10 and the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
arty 11 and the European Data Protection Supervisor 12 sug- 
est a broader assessment including analysis of the societal 
nd ethical consequences of data use. However, despite these 
teps in the direction of an assessment no longer primarily fo- 
used on data quality and data security, Article 35 of the GDPR 
nd the early assessment models from Data Protection Au- 
horities (hereinafter DPAs) do not adequately highlight ethi- 
al and social issues.13 
In this scenario, there is a clear tension between the in- 
reasing demand for ethically and socially oriented data use 10 Recital n. 75, GDPR. 
11 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Guidelines 
n Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining 
hether processing is “likely to result in a high risk” for the 
urposes of Regulation 2016/679’, adopted on 4 April 2017 as last 
evised and adopted on 4 October 2017 < http://ec.europa.eu/ 
ewsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item _ id=611236 > accessed 
3 April 2018. 
12 See EDPS - Ethics Advisory Group, ‘Towards a digital ethics’ 
2018) < https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-01- 
5 _ eag _ report _ en.pdf> accessed 4 March 2018. 
13 See e.g. CNIL, ‘Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA). Knowledge 
ases’ (2018) < https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ 
nil- pia- 3- en- knowledgebases- 2018- 02- 19 _ diffusable _ en _ pdf _ 
alide _ jli.pdf> accessed 28 February 2018; CNIL, ‘Privacy Impact 
ssessment (PIA). Methodology’ (2018) < https://www.cnil.fr/sites/ 
efault/files/atoms/files/cnil- pia- 1- en- methodology- 2018- 02- 19 _ 
iffusable _ en _ pdf _ valide _ jli.pdf> accessed 28 February 2018; 
NIL, ‘Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA). Templates’ (2018) < https: 
/www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cnil- pia- 2- en- 
emplates.pdf> accessed 28 February 2018; Information 
ommissioner’s Office, ‘Data Protection Impact Assess- 
ents draft guidance for consultation’ (2018) and Infor- 
ation Commissioner’s Office, ‘Data Protection Impact As- 
essments draft template for consultation’ (2018) < https: 
/ico.org.uk/about- the- ico/ico- and- stakeholder- consultations/ 
ata- protection- impact- assessments- dpias- guidance/ > ac- 
essed 30 April 2018; Agencia Española de Protección 
e Datos, ‘Guía Práctica de Análisis de riesgos en los 
ratamientos de datos personales sujetos al RGPD’ (2018) 
 https://www.agpd.es/portalwebAGPD/canaldocumentacion/ 
ublicaciones/common/Guias/2018/AnalisisDeRiesgosRGPD.pdf> 
ccesed 4 March 2018; Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 
Guía práctica para las evaluaciones de impacto en la protec- 
ión de los datos sujetas al RGPD’ (2018) < https://www.agpd.es/ 
ortalwebAGPD/canaldocumentacion/publicaciones/common/ 
uias/2018/Guia _ EvaluacionesImpacto.pdf> accesed 4 March 
018; Autoridad Catalana de Protección de Datos, ‘Guía sobre 
a evaluación de impacto relativa a la protección de datos en el 
GPD (2.0)’ (January 2018) < http://apdcat.gencat.cat/web/.content/ 
3-documentacio/Reglament _ general _ de _ proteccio _ de _ dades/ 
ocuments/GUIA- EVALUACION- DE- IMPACTO- CAST- 2.0.pdf> 
ccessed 28 February 2018. 
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brom citizens,14 companies,15 developers and computer scien- 
ists, on the one hand, and the lack of a regulatory framework 
o address these issues, on the other. Although this gap is par- 
ially filled by a variety of bottom-up initiatives,16 corporate 
uidance 17 or ongoing public investigations,18 the main limi- ata-intensive and high-tech companies to set up their own 
thics committees or advisory boards. See, e.g., Natasha Lo- 
as, ‘DeepMind now has an AI ethics research unit. We have 
 few questions for it…’ TechCrunch (4 October 2017) < http: 
/social.techcrunch.com/2017/10/04/deepmind- now- has- an- ai- 
thics-research-unit-we-have-a-few-questions-for-it/ > ac- 
essed; Axon AI Ethics Board < https://it.axon.com/info/ai-ethics > 
ccessed 9 May 2018; DNA Web Team, ‘Google draft- 
ng ethical guidelines to guide use of tech after employ- 
es protest defence project’ DNA India (15 April 2018) 
 http://www.dnaindia.com/technology/report- google- drafting- 
thical- guidelines- to- guide- use- of- tech- after- employees- protest- 
efence- project- 2605149 > accessed 7 May 2018. See also 
nited Nations, 2011. Guiding Principles on Business and 
uman Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, 
espect and Remedy” Framework. United Nations Human 
ights Council (UN Doc. HR/PUB/11/04). See also Jordan 
ovet, ‘Facebook Forms Ethics Team to Prevent Bias in AI 
oftware’, 3 May 2018. < https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/03/ 
acebook- ethics- team- prevents- bias- in- ai- software.html > 
ccessed 9 May 2018; Microsoft, ‘FATE: Fairness, Accountabil- 
ty, Transparency, and Ethics in AI’. Microsoft Research (blog) 
 https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/group/fate/ > ac- 
essed 11 May 2018. 
16 See, e.g., Ester Fritsch, Irina Shklovski and Rachel Douglas- 
ones, ‘Calling for a revolution: An analysis of IoT man- 
festos’ (2018) Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference 
n Human Factors in Computing (Montreal, Canada, 21- 
6 April 2018) < http://delivery.acm.org/10.1145/3180000/ 
173876/paper302.pdf?ip=80.180.146.48&id=3173876&acc= 
PEN&key=4D4702B0C3E38B35%2E4D4702B0C3E38B35% 
E4D4702B0C3E38B35%2E6D218144511F3437& _ _ acm _ _ = 
525873755 _ 622581693e4344f67627f0aec1be630b > accessed 3 
ay 2018. 
17 See above fn 15. See also the Asilomar AI Principles < https:// 
utureoflife.org/ai-principles/ > accessed 27 March 2018. 
18 See, e.g., Villani Cédric and others, ‘Donner un sens à
’intelligence artificielle : pour une stratégie nationale et eu- 
opéenne’ (2018) < http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/ 
apports-publics/184000159/index.shtml > accessed 14 April 
018 ; House of Lords - Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence, 
AI in the UK: ready, willing and able?’ (2018) < https://publications. 
arliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldai/100/100.pdf> accessed 
6 April 2018. See also the ongoing initiative of the European Union 
gency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) to map the impact of big 
ata on fundamental rights < http://fra.europa.eu/en/event/2018/ 
apping- impact- big- data- fundamental- rights > accessed 5 April 
018, the ongoing studies on data processing and AI launched 
y the Council of Europe (MSI-AUT Committee and Consultative 
computer law & security review 34 (2018) 754–772 757 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 Article 2, UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); art. tations of these initiatives concern the variety of values, ap-
proaches and models adopted.19 
Against this background, this article tries to sketch out a
uniform model, which provides a general common ground for
value assessment in data processing 20 and, at the same time,
offers a sufficient level of flexibility to give voice to different
viewpoints. This not only provides a more systematic risk as-
sessment scheme, described here in its main elements, but
also outlines a more coherent theoretical framework for the
proposed model. 
Regarding the safeguarded interests that should be con-
sidered in assessing the potential negative impacts of data
use, studies in the field of collective data protection 21 have
pointed out the importance of the social and ethical implica-
tions of data processing in the context of data-intensive ap-
plications.22 
Predictive policing software, credit scoring models and
many other algorithmic decision-support systems highlight
how data analysis strategies are centred on groups and soci-
ety at large. The potential negative outcomes of data use are,
therefore, no longer restricted to the more widely recognised
privacy-related risks (e.g. illegitimate use of personal informa-Committee of the Convention for the protection of individuals 
with regard to automatic processing of personal data, and the 
European Commission’s Call for a High-Level Expert Group on Ar- 
tificial Intelligence < https://ec.europa.eu/digital- single- market/ 
en/news/call- high- level- expert- group- artificial- intelligence > 
accessed 12 April 2018. 
19 See European Commission - European Group on, Ethics 
in Science and, & New Technologies, ‘Statement on Artificial 
Intelligence, Robotics and ‘Autonomous’ Systems’ (2018) 11 
< https://ec.europa.eu/research/ege/pdf/ege _ ai _ statement _ 2018. 
pdf> accessed 4 April 2018 (“Current efforts represent a patchwork 
of disparate initiatives”). 
20 See, in this sense, European Commission - European Group on, 
Ethics in Science and, & New Technologies (n 19) 11–12 (“There 
is a clear need for a collective, wide-ranging and inclusive pro- 
cess that would pave the way towards a common, internationally 
recognised ethical framework for the design, production, use and 
governance of AI, robots and ‘autonomous’ systems […] This state- 
ment calls for the launch of such a process and proposes a set of 
fundamental ethical principles and democratic prerequisites that 
could also guide reflection on binding law”). 
21 See Mantelero, ‘Personal data for decisional purposes’ (n 
7); Linnet Taylor, Luciano Floridi, Bart van der Sloot (eds), 
Group Privacy: New Challenges of Data Technologies (Springer 
International Publishing, 2017); Anton H. Vedder, ‘Privatization, In- 
formation Technology and Privacy: Reconsidering the Social Re- 
sponsibilities of Private Organizations’ in Geoff Moore (ed) Busi- 
ness Ethics: Principles and Practice (Business Education Publishers 
1997) 215–226; David Wright and Michael Friedewald, ‘Integrating 
privacy and ethical impact assessments’ (2013) 40(6) Science and 
Public Policy 755–766; David Wight and Emilio Mordini, ‘Privacy 
and Ethical Impact Assessment’ in David Wright and Paul De Hert 
(eds) Privacy Impact Assessment (Springer Netherlands 2012) 397–
418; Charles Raab and David Wright, ‘Surveillance: Extending the 
Limits of Privacy Impact Assessment’ in David Wright and Paul De 
Hert (eds) Privacy Impact Assessment 363–383. 
22 See also Bernd Carsten Stahl and David Wright, ‘Proactive En- 
gagement with Ethics and Privacy in AI and Big Data - Implement- 
ing responsible research and innovation in AI-related projects’ 
(2018) < https://www.dora.dmu.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/2086/15328 > 
accessed 26 April 2018. tion, data security), but also include other potential prejudices
(e.g. discrimination) that can be better addressed by placing
data processing in the broader context of human rights.23 
This article proposes a model, which is a variation of the
Human Rights Impact Assessment.24 The characteristic and
particular features of this model can be seen from a compari-
son with other existing assessment strategies, such as the Pri-
vacy Impact Assessment (PIA), the Social Impact Assessment
(SIA) and the Ethical Impact Assessment (EtIA).25 On the one
hand, the limitations affecting the existing PIA models and
the Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) described in
the GDPR provide the key reason to embrace a broader stand-
point, moving towards a Human Rights Impact Assessment
(HRIA).26 On the other hand, the granularity and the coverage
of the SIA/EtIA models make them unsuitable as candidates
for a general assessment of the consequences of a given data
use. 
The HRIA is not a new approach per se .27 It has its roots
in the environment impact assessment models and develop-14, Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; art. 21 EU Charter of Funda- 
mental Rights of the European Union. See also The IEEE Global Ini- 
tiative for Ethical Considerations in Artificial Intelligence and Au- 
tonomous Systems, ‘Ethically Aligned Design: A Vision For Priori- 
tizing Wellbeing With Artificial Intelligence And Autonomous Sys- 
tems, Version 1. IEEE, 2016’ 16 < http://standards.ieee.org/develop/ 
indconn/ec/autonomous _ systems.html > accessed 21 February 
2018; Giovanni Sartor, ‘Human Rights and Information Technolo- 
gies’ in Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford and Karen Yeung (eds) 
The Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation, and Technology (Oxford Uni- 
versity Press 2017) 424–450. 
24 See below Section 2 . 
25 Although other authors, e.g. Wright and Mordini (n 21), use the 
acronym EIA for Ethical Impact Assessment, the different acronym 
EtIA is used here to avoid any confusion with the Environmental 
Impact Assessment, which is usually identified with the acronym 
EIA. 
26 The notion of human rights adopted here refers to the rights 
recognised by the international human rights declarations. See 
also European Parliament, Resolution of 23 October 2008 on 
the impact of aviation security measures and body scanners 
on human rights, privacy, personal dignity and data protec- 
tion < http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-/ 
/EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-0521+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN > accessed 
12 December 2017, where European Parliament asked the Com- 
mission to carry out an impact assessment relating to fundamen- 
tal rights. 
27 See, ex multis , The Danish Institute for Human Rights, Human 
rights impact assessment guidance and toolbox (The Danish Institute 
for Human Rights, 2016) < https://www.humanrights.dk/business/ 
tools/human- rights- impact- assessment- guidance- and- toolbox > 
accessed 20 December 2017; Paul De Hert, ‘A Human Rights 
Perspective on Privacy and Data Protection Impact Assessments’ 
in Wright and De Hert (n 21), 33-76; James Harrison, and Mary- 
Ann Stephenson, Human Rights Impact Assessment: Review of 
Practice and Guidance for Future Assessments . (Scottish Human 
Rights Commission, 2010) < http://fian-ch.org/content/uploads/ 
HRIA-Review-of-Practice-and-Guidance-for-Future-Assessments. 
pdf > accessed 29 November 2017; Simon Mark Walker, The 
Future of Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade Agree- 
ments. (Utrecht: G.J. Wiarda Institute for Legal Research 2009) 
< https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/36620/ 
walker.pdf?sequence=2 > accessed 26 April 2018. 
758 computer law & security review 34 (2018) 754–772 
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eent studies,28 but it has not yet been applied in the context 
f data processing.29 Moreover, the HRIA can be enhanced by 
onsidering ethical and societal issues, which are playing an 
ver more central role today, given the enormous changes to 
ociety brought by technology and datafication. 
Ethical and societal values necessarily influence the 
alance between the different interests in the HRIA model 
nd attention to these values makes it possible to adopt a 
roader assessment covering questions that are not always 
roperly addressed by human rights jurisprudence, data 
rotection regulations or other laws safeguarding individual 
ights and freedoms. Moreover, the importance of ethical and 
ocial perspectives allows data controllers to better address 
he broader perspective of collective data protection, which 
ay be partially limited by the individual dimension of 
undamental rights and freedoms. 
For these reasons, the Human Rights Impact Assessment 
n data protection should evolve into a more complete Hu- 
an Rights, Ethical and Social Impact Assessment (HRESIA).
urthermore, the attention paid to the collective dimension 
f data protection suggests a design based on a participatory 
rocess, open to the contribution of the different stakeholders 
nd characterised by a certain degree of transparency. 
Finally, it should be pointed out how the HRESIA model 
iffers from other broader approaches oriented more closely 
owards a Responsible Research Innovation assessment. The 
atter takes into account a variety of different societal issues,
hich do not necessarily concern fundamental rights and 
reedoms 30 (e.g. interoperability, openness).31 28 See Walker (n 27), 3–4; Tarek F. Massarani, Margo Tatgenhorst 
rakos, and Joanna Pajkowska, ‘Extracting Corporate Responsibil- 
ty: Towards a Human Rights Impact Assessment’ (2007) 40(1) Cor- 
ell International Law Journal 135, 143–149. See also Rabel J. Burdge 
nd Frank Vanclay, ‘Social Impact Assessment: A Contribution to 
he State of the Art Series’ (1996) 14(1) Impact Assessment 59, 62–64. 
29 A suggestion in this sense was provided by the Coun- 
il of Europe-Committee of experts on internet intermediaries 
MSI-NET), ‘Study on the human rights dimensions of auto- 
ated data processing techniques (in particular algorithms) 
nd possible regulatory implications’ (2018), 45 < https://rm.coe. 
nt/algorithms- and- human- rights- en- rev/16807956b5 > accessed 
 April 2018 (“Human rights impact assessments should be con- 
ucted before making use of algorithmic decision-making in all 
reas of public administration”). 
30 Regarding this sort of hendiadys (“fundamental rights and free- 
oms”), see also Paul De Hert and Serge Gutwirth, ‘Rawls’ political 
onception of rights and liberties. An unliberal but pragmatic ap- 
roach to the problems of harmonisation and globalisation’ in Van 
oecke, Mark, Epistemology and methodology of comparative law in the 
ight of European Integration . (Hart Publishing, 2004) 319-320 (“legal 
cholars in Europe have devoted much energy in transforming or 
ranslating liberty questions into questions of ’human rights’. One 
f the advantages of this ’rights approach’ is purely strategic: it fa- 
ilitates the bringing of cases before the European Court of Human 
ights, a Court that is considered to have higher legal status […] 
here are however more reasons to think in terms of rights. It is 
ightly observed that the concept of human rights in legal prac- 
ice is closely linked to the concept of subjective rights. Lawyers 
o like the idea of subjective rights. They think these offer better 
rotection than ‘liberty’ or ‘liberties’ ”). 
31 Regarding this approach in the context of data processing, see 
lso H2020 Virt-EU project < https://virteuproject.eu/ > accessed 19 
ecember 2017. 
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mHaving defined the general framework, Section 2 describes 
he boundaries of the proposed model and its main focus,
hile Section 3 discusses the main components of the HRE- 
IA, which include expert committees that concur in defining 
he rights, freedoms and values that play a role in the assess- 
ent of a given data-driven application. 
. Outline of the HRESIA model 
he use of algorithms in the context of modern data pro- 
essing techniques 32 as well as data-intensive technological 
rends 33 have led to the adoption of a broader viewpoint in 
ringing into focus the issues concerning data processing.
his has forced groups of experts 34 and scholars 35 to go be- 
ond the traditional sphere of data protection and consider 
he impact of data use on fundamental rights and collective 
ocial and ethical values. This article sets out to embed these 
arious suggestions in an assessment model with an architec- 
ure made up of two main elements: a self-assessment tool 
questionnaire) and an ad hoc expert committee. 
The assessment tool is used to define the framework – in 
erms of values – that data-intensive systems should comply 
ith, while the expert committee contextualises this frame- 
ork in a given data-intensive application. In this way, the 
eneral values can be operationalised by means of a tailored 
pplication consistent with the data processing context. 
This approach does not involve any new procedures. Sev- 
ral assessment models are based on a set of benchmark val- 
es or principles and an assessment entity that applies these 
alues/principles in a concrete case. Here the main challenge 
s represented by the complexity and variety of values that can 
e adopted as a benchmark. 
Against this background, there are three preliminary de- 
isions to be made regarding the benchmark. The first con- 
erns the dimension to adopt when defining the values used 
n the model (common/universal values or local and context- 
pecific values). The second concerns the type of assessment 
o be adopted (a value-oriented assessment or a risks/benefits 
ssessment). The last one regards the values to be considered 
legal or societal and ethical values). 
These are not necessarily binary decisions. For example,
niversal and local approaches may be combined. The way 
hese issues are addressed affects the core elements of the 
roposed model. To provide an overall idea of the model, the 
ey decisions concerning its architecture are presented in this 
ection, while the following sections focus on the rationale be- 
ind these decisions. 
Although the proposed model combines the human rights 
ssessment approach with attention to the societal and ethi- 
al consequences of data use,36 this is not a broad social im- 
act assessment, but remains focused on human rights. In 
his sense, ethical and social values are seen through the lens 32 See Council of Europe-Committee of experts on internet inter- 
ediaries (MSI-NET) (n 29). 
33 See EDPS - Ethics Advisory Group (n 12). 
34 See above fn. 32 and 33. 
35 See above fn. 21. 
36 See below Section 2 . 
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Table 1 – HRESIA model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 See e.g., with regard to software development, the Manifesto 
for Agile Software Development < http://agilemanifesto.org/ > ac- of human rights and are used to go beyond the limitations that
the legal theory or practical implementation of such rights
may imply in effectively addressing the current issues con-
cerning the societal impacts of data use. 
Moreover, ethical and social values are key to the interpre-
tation of human rights in coherence with the regional context,
in many cases representing the unspoken aspect of the legal
reasoning behind the decisions of the Data Protection Author-
ities (DPAs) and courts.37 In this sense, the suggested model is
a Human Rights, Ethical and Social Impact Assessment (HRE-
SIA). 
The model proposed here is intended to provide a self-
assessment tool, which data controllers can use to identify
values and give them a clearer perception when designing
their products/services. However, general background values
and their contextual application may be not enough to ad-
dress the societal changes when designing data-intensive sys-
tems. Although balanced with respect to the context, the def-
inition of such rights and values may remain theoretical and
need to be further tailored to the specific data processing
application. 
To achieve a balance in specific cases, individuals with the
right skills are needed to apply this set of rights and values
in the given situation. There are cases though in which bridg-
ing the gap between the theory of rights and values and their
concrete application is complicated by the nature of data use
and the complexity of the associated risks. In such cases, the
assessment should be carried out by an ad hoc panel of ex-
perts, just as ethics committees 38 apply general principles and
guidelines to a specific case. 
This second element (the HRESIA committee) of the model
makes it easier to provide specific answers to the issues raised
by the given application ( Table 1 ). The ad hoc committee also
supports the development of an assessment characterised by
transparency, participation and circularity. 
Given the social issues that underpin this model, an essen-
tial requirement of the HRESIA is transparency. In this sense,
the assessment is not only designed to mitigate the societal
consequences, but also to give data subjects a better under-
standing of the data processing and, therefore, greater self-
determination. Transparency is thus the basis for a participa-
tory approach, as can be seen in other fields where impact
assessments concern the societal consequences of technol-
ogy (e.g. environment impact assessments). But transparency
does not entail full disclosure of the assessment procedure
and must be balanced against the safeguarding of other in-
terests recognised by law (e.g. industrial secrets). 
Finally, along the lines of risk management models, the
assessment process should be characterised by a circular
approach from the earliest stages ( Table 2 ). This is also con-
sistent with the circular product development models that
focus on flexibility and interaction with users to address37 See below Section 2.1.1 . 
38 See Javier Arias Díaz and others, ‘Ethics assessment and 
guidance in different types of organisations Research Ethics 
Committees’ SATORI project < http://satoriproject.eu/media/3. 
a-Research-ethics-committees.pdf> accessed 23 April 2018. See 
also World Health Organization, Research ethics committees basic con- 
cepts for capacity-building (World Health Organization, 2009). customers’ needs,39 which in this case are also legal and
societal requirements ( Table 3 ). 
2.1. Comparison with other assessment models 
The focus on data processing and the legal and societal im-
pacts of data use require us to compare HRESIA with existing
impact assessment models, both the specific data protection
models (Privacy Impact Assessment-PIA and Data Protection
Impact Assessment–DPIA) and those more interested in the
societal (Social Impact Assessment–SIA) and ethical (Ethical
Impact Assessment - EtIA 40 ) consequences. cessed 5 February 2018. See also Seda Gürses and Joris Van 
Hoboken, ‘Privacy after the Agile Turn’ in Jules Polonetsky, Omer 
Tene, and Evan Selinger (eds) Cambridge Handbook of Consumer Pri- 
vacy (Cambridge University Press, 2017) < https://osf.io/preprints/ 
socarxiv/9gy73/ or https://osf.io/ufdvb/ > accesed 28 March 2018. 
40 See SATORI project. ‘Ethics assessment for research and inno- 
vation — Part 2: Ethical impact assessment framework’ 6 < http: 
//satoriproject.eu/media/CWA- SATORI _ part- 2 _ WD4- 20170510W. 
pdf> accessed 24 April 2018, which defines ethical impact as the 
760 computer law & security review 34 (2018) 754–772 
Table 2 – HRESIA and product/service development. 
Table 3 – HRESIA and product/service life-circle. p
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pThis comparison takes a progressive approach, from im- 
act assessments mainly focused on data (PIA and DPIA) to 
hose more centred on societal and ethical issues (SIA and 
tIA). The relationship between these different models can be 
hought of as a series of concentric rings,41 where HRESIA is 
ntermediate between the other two. 
.1.1. HRESIA in the context of data processing impact 
ssessments 
he focus on the risks arising from data processing has 
een an essential element of data protection regulation from 
he outset, though over the years this risk has evolved in impact that concerns or affects human rights and responsibil- 
ties, benefits and harms, justice and fairness, well-being and 
he social good”. See also the Privacy, Ethical and Social Impact 
ssessment (PESIA) proposed in the context of the H2020 Virt-EU 
roject < https://virteuproject.eu > accessed 27 April 2018. 
41 See Raab and Wright (n 21) 376–382. 
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 a variety of ways.42 The original concern about government
surveillance 43 has been joined by new concerns regarding the
economic exploitation of personal information (risk of unfair
or unauthorised uses of personal information 44 ) and, nowa-
days, by the increasing number of decision-making processes
based on information (risk of discrimination, large-scale so-
cial surveillance, and bias in predictive analyses 45 ). 
From a theoretical perspective, this focus on the potential
adverse effects of data use has not been an explicit element
of data protection laws. Many of their provisions adopt a pro-
cedural approach that leaves in the shadows the safeguarded
interests, which are encapsulated in the broad and general no-
tion of data protection. 
Moreover, compared to other personality rights, such as
right to image or name, data protection has a proteiform na-
ture, since data may consist in name, numbers, behavioural
information, genetic data or many other forms of information.
The progressive datafication of our world makes it difficult to
find something that is not or cannot be transformed into data.
The consequent broad notion of data protection covers differ-
ent fields and has partially absorbed some elements tradition-
ally protected by other personality rights.46 42 See Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law. Approaching Its Ratio- 
nale, Logic and Limits (Kluwer Law International 2002), 107–112; 
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, ‘Generational development of data pro- 
tection in Europe?’ in Philip E. Agre and Marc Rotenberg (eds), 
Technology and privacy: The new landscape (MIT Press 1997) 221–
225; Colin J. Bennett, Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public 
Policy in Europe and the United States (Cornell University Press 1992) 
29–33, 47. See also Arthur R. Miller, The Assault on Privacy Comput- 
ers, Data Banks, Dossiers (University of Michigan Press 1971) 54–67; 
Myron Brenton, The Privacy Invaders (Coward-McCann 1964); Vance 
Packard, The Naked Society (David McKay 1964); Secretary’s Advi- 
sory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, ‘Records, 
Computers and the Rights of Citizens’ (1973) < http://epic.org/ 
privacy/hew1973report/ > accessed 27 September 2016. 
43 See Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Atheneum 1970). 
44 See also Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte and George 
Loewenstein, ‘Privacy and human behavior in the age of in- 
formation’ (2015) 347(6221) Science 509–514; Laura Brandi- 
marte, Alessandro Acquisti, and George Loewenstein, ‘Misplaced 
Confidences: Privacy and the Control Paradox’ (2010), Ninth 
Annual Workshop on the Economics of Information Secu- 
rity < http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/ ∼acquisti/papers/acquisti-SPPS. 
pdf> accessed 27 February 2017; Joseph Turow and other, ‘The 
Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Privacy in the Coming 
Decade’ (2007) 3 ISJLP 723–749 < http://scholarship.law.berkeley. 
edu/facpubs/935 > accessed 27 February 2017; Daniel J. Solove, ‘In- 
troduction: Privacy Self-management and The Consent Dilemma’ 
(2013) 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1880, 1883–1888. 
45 See, inter alia , Andrew D. Selbst, ‘Disparate Impact in Big Data 
Policing’ (2018) 52(1) Georgia Law Review 109-195; Mireille Hilde- 
brandt, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law : Novel Entangle- 
ments of Law and Technology (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 191–
195; Solon Barocas and Andrew D. Selbsr, ‘Big Data’s Disparate Im- 
pact’ (2016) 104 (3) California Law Review 671–732; Mantelero, ‘Per- 
sonal data for decisional purposes’ (n 7). 
46 See also bart van der Sloot, ‘Privacy as Personality Right: Why 
the ECtHR’s Focus on Ulterior Interests Might Prove Indispensable 
in the Age of “Big Data”’ (2015) 31(80) Utrecht Journal of Interna- 
tional and European Law 25–50 (“the right to privacy has been used 
by the Court to provide protection to a number of matters which 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Against this background, the idea of control over informa-
tion was used to aggregate the different forms of data protec-
tion and to find a common core.47 The procedural approach is
consistent with this idea, since it secures all the stages of data
processing, from data collection to communication of data to
third parties. Nevertheless, control over information describes
the nature of the power, which the law grants to the data sub-
ject, not its theoretical foundations. 
In this regard, part of the legal doctrine has pointed
out the role of human dignity as a foundational ground
of data protection in Europe.48 However, interplay with the
non-discrimination principle,49 the role of data protection in
the public sphere and in digital citizenship 50 suggest that a
broader range of values underpin data protection. 
Although more recently data protection regulations 51 and
practices 52 have adopted a more explicit risk-based approach
to address the varying challenges of data use, they still focus
on the procedural aspects. Data management procedures rep-
resent, therefore, a form of risk management based on the reg-
ulation of the different stages of data processing (collection,
analysis and communication) and the definition of the pow-
ers and tasks of the various subjects involved in this process. 
This procedural approach and the focus of risk assessment
on data management have led data protection authorities to
propose assessment models (PIA) primarily centred on data
quality and data security, leaving aside the nature of safe-
guarded interests. Instead, these interests are taken into ac-
count by DPAs and courts in their decisions, but – since data
protection laws provide limited explicit references to the safe-
guarded values, rights and freedoms – the analysis of the rel-
evant interest is frequently curtailed or not adequately elabo-
rated.53 fall primarily under the realm of other rights and freedoms con- 
tained in the Convention”). 
47 See also Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard Uni- 
versity Press, 2008) 12–38; Westin (n 43) 330–399. 
48 See James Q. Whitman, ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: 
Dignity versus Liberty’ (2004) 113 The Yale Law Journal 1151–1221. 
49 See, in this sense, the notion of special categories of data in 
art. 6 of the Convention 108 adopted by the Council of Europe 
and in art. 9 of the GDPR. The White House, ‘Administration 
Discussion Draft: Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act 2015’ 
< https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/ 
legislative/letters/cpbr- act- of- 2015- discussion- draft.pdf> ac- 
cessed 25 June 2017. See also The White House, ‘A Consumer 
Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for Protect- 
ing Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital 
Economy’ (2012), Appendix A: The Consumer Privacy Bill of 
Rights < https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/ 
files/privacy-final.pdf> accessed 4 December 2017. 
50 See Stefano Rodotà, ‘Privacy, Freedom, and Dignity: Conclu- 
sive Remarks at the 26th International Conference on Privacy and 
Personal Data Protection’ (2004) < http://www.garanteprivacy.it/ 
web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/export/1049293 > ac- 
cessed 16 December 2017. 
51 See articles 24 and 35, GDPR. 
52 See Wright and De Hert (n 21). 
53 See, e.g., the following decisions: Garante per la protezione dei 
dati personali (Italian DPA), 1 February 2018, doc. web n. 8159221; 
Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, 8 September 2016, n. 
350, doc. web 5497522; Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, 
4 June 2015, n. 345, doc. web n. 4211000; Garante per la protezione 
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cData protection authorities and courts prefer using argu- 
ents grounded on the set of criteria provided by data protec- 
ion regulations.54 The legitimate nature of the purposes, law- 
ulness and fairness of processing, transparency, purpose lim- 
tation, data minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation, data 
ntegrity and confidentiality are general principles frequently 
sed by data protection authorities in their argumentations.55 
owever, these principles are only an indirect expression of 
he safeguarded interests. Most of them are general clauses 
hat may be interpreted more or less broadly and require an 
mplicit consideration of the interests underpinning data use.
Moreover, the indefinite nature of these clauses has fre- 
uently led to the adoption of the criterion of proportional- 
ty,56 which is a sort of synthesis of the evaluation of the dif- 
erent competing interests 57 by courts or the DPAs. In fact, this 
alancing of interests and the reasoning that resulted in a spe- 
ific border between them is often implicit in the notion of 
roportionality and not discussed in the decisions taken by 
he DPAs or discussed in an axiomatic manner.58 
Against this scenario, it is difficult for data controllers to 
nderstand and outline the set of values that they should take 
nto account in developing their data-intensive devices and 
ervices, since these values and their mutual interaction re- 
ain unclear and undeclared. Nor is this difficulty solved by 
he adoption of PIAs, since these assessment models merely 
oint out the need to consider aspects other than data quality 
nd data security, without specifically elaborating them and ei dati personali, 8 May 2013, n. 230, doc. web n. 2433401; Agen- 
ia Española de Protección de Datos (Spanish DPA), Expediente 
. 01769/2017; Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Expedi- 
nte n. 01760/2017; Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Res- 
lución R/01208/2014; Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 
Gabinet Juridico) Informe 0392/2011; Agencia Española de Protec- 
ión de Datos, (Gabinet Juridico) Informe 368/2006; Commission de 
a protection de la vie privée (Belgian DPA), 15 December 2010, rac- 
omandation n. 05/2010; Commission Nationale de l’Informatique 
t des Libertés (French DPA), 17 July 2014, deliberation n. 2014-307; 
ommission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, 21 June 
994, deliberation n. 94-056. 
54 Regarding the focus of DPAs’ decisions on national data pro- 
ection regulations and their provisions, see also the results of the 
mpirical analysis carried out by Maria Grazia Porcedda, ‘Use of 
he Charter of Fundamental Rights by National Data Protection 
uthorities and the EDPS’ (Centre for Judicial Cooperation(CJC) 
obert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European Uni- 
ersity Institute, 2017) < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
bstract _ id=3157786 > accessed 24 April 2018. 
55 See above fn 53. 
56 See De Hert (n 27), 46, who defines the application of the prin- 
iple of proportionality as a “political” test. With regard to the ju- 
isprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, this author 
lso points out how “The golden trick for Strasbourg is to see al- 
ost every privacy relevant element as one that has to do with the 
equired legal basis”. 
57 See also Sébastien van Drooghenbroeck, La proportionnalité dans 
e droit de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme: prendre l’idée 
imple au sérieux (Publications Fac St Louis, 2001) 302. 
58 See e.g. Court of Justice of the European Union, 13 May 2014, 
ase C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de 
rotección de Datos, Mario Costeja González, para 81 (“In the light 
f the potential seriousness of that interference, it is clear that it 
annot be justified by merely the economic interest which the op- 
rator of such an engine has in that processing”, emphasis added). 
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Eroviding effective tools to identify and operationalise broader 
ocial values. 
In the same way, the recent EU DPIA – according to the first 
odels proposed by DPAs – does not offer a better answer. De- 
pite specific references in the GDPR to the safeguarding of 
ights and freedoms in general as well as to societal issues,59 
he new assessment models do not seem to increase the 
ocus on societal consequences that is present in the existing 
IAs.60 
In this light, the main goal of the HRESIA model is to fill
his gap, providing an assessment model focused on the rights 
nd freedoms 61 that may be affected by data processing. With 
egard to the EU context, this is in line with the declared intent
f the GDPR and may provide a valuable tool on carrying out 
he risk assessment outlined in the Regulation, which focuses 
n the “risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons”.62 
.1.2. The HRESIA and the collective dimension of data protec- 
ion 
hifting the focus from the traditional sphere of data quality 
nd security to fundamental rights and freedoms, the HRESIA 
odel help data controllers to address the collective dimen- 
ion of data processing. In this sense, the issues concerning 
ata-intensive applications and their use in decision-making 
rocesses concern a variety of interests related to several fun- 
amental rights and freedoms. Not only does the risk of dis- 
rimination represent one of the biggest challenges of these 
pplications, but other rights and freedoms also assume rele- 
ance, such as the right to the integrity of the person, to edu-
ation, to be equal before the law, and the freedom of move- 
ent, of thought, of expression, of assembly and freedom in 
he workplace.63 
Against this scenario, the last question that the proposed 
odel must address from a theoretical standpoint concerns 59 See Recital n. 75. 
60 For a proposal of integration of PIA and EtIA, see Wright and 
riedewald (n 21) 760–762. However, these authors do not adopt a 
roader viewpoint focused on human rights assessment. 
61 Despite this difference, HRESIA and PIA/DPIA take a common 
pproach in terms of architecture, since both are rights-based as- 
essments. From this standpoint, the HRESIA interpretation of the 
eneral clauses and principles in the data protection regulations 
ith respect to broader human rights becomes the core element 
f the rights-based approach. See also The Danish Institute for Hu- 
an Rights (n 27) 76 (“Human rights impacts cannot be subject to 
offsetting’ in the same way that, for example, environmental im- 
acts can be. For example, a carbon offset is a reduction in emis- 
ions of carbon dioxide made in order to compensate for or to off- 
et an emission made elsewhere. With human rights impacts on 
he other hand, due to the fact that human rights are indivisible 
nd interrelated, it is not considered appropriate to offset one hu- 
an rights impact with a ‘positive contribution’ elsewhere”). 
62 See Article 35, GDPR on risk assessment. The same reference to 
he rights and freedoms is also present in several other provisions 
f the GDPR. 
63 See also Council of Europe-Committee of experts on internet 
ntermediaries (MSI-NET) (n 29) and EDPS – Ethics Advisory Group 
n 12). See also van der Sloot, B. (2015). Privacy as Personality Right: 
hy the ECtHR’s Focus on Ulterior Interests Might Prove Indis- 
ensable in the Age of “Big Data”. Utrecht Journal of International and 
uropean Law , 31 (80), 25–50. 
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68 See also Article 14, European Convention on Human Rights, 
which contains an open-ended list of potential fields in which dis- 
criminatory practices can be adopted. 
69 This notion must encompass both the prejudicial treatment 
of groups of people – regardless of whether they belong to special 
categories –, and the consequences of unintentional bias in the 
design, data collection and decision-making stages of Big Data 
applications. Indeed, these consequences may negatively impact 
on individuals and society, even though they do not concern 
forms of discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs or other elements 
that traditionally characterise minorities or vulnerable groups. 
For example, Kate Crawford has described the case of the City of 
Boston and its StreetBump smartphone app to passively detect 
potholes. The application had a signal problem, due to the bias 
generated by the low penetration of smartphones among lower 
income and older residents. While the Boston administration took 
this bias into account and solved the problem, less enlightened 
public officials might underestimate such considerations and 
make potentially discriminatory decisions See Kate Crawford, 
‘The Hidden Biases in Big Data’ (2013) Harv. Bus. Rev. April 1, 
2013, < https://hbr.org/2013/04/the- hidden- biases- in- big- data > 
accessed 29 January 2018; Jonas Lerman, ‘Big Data and Its Ex- 
clusions’ (2013) 66 Stan. L. Rev. Online 55. Another example is 
the Progressive case, in which an insurance company obliged 
drivers to install a small monitoring device in their cars in order the compatibility of the collective dimension of data pro-
tection 64 and the way human rights are framed by legal
scholars. To answer to this question, it is necessary to high-
light how the notion of collective data protection tried to
go beyond the individual dimension of data protection and
its focus on data quality and security, suggesting a broader
range of safeguarded interests and affecting individuals as a
group. 
An impact assessment focused on the broader category of
human rights, which also takes into account the ethical and
societal issues concerning data use, can provide an answer to
this need. This broader perspective and the varied range of hu-
man rights makes it possible to consider the impacts of data
use more fully, not only limited to data protection. Moreover,
several principles, rights and freedoms in the charters of hu-
man rights directly or indirectly address groups or collective
issues. 
However, in the context of human rights 65 as well as
data protection, legal doctrine and the regulatory framework
are focused primarily on the individual dimension. Further-
more, in some cases, the theoretical human rights back-
ground provides a limited notion of these rights and free-
doms, which is inadequate to handle the new challenges of
technology.66 
In this sense, for example, the approach to classification
adopted by modern algorithms does not merely focus on in-
dividuals and on the categories traditionally used to support
unjust or prejudicial treatment of different groups of people.67 
On the contrary, algorithms create groups or clusters of people
based on different and more varied characteristics (e.g. cus-
tomer habits, lifestyle, online and offline behaviour, network
of personal relationships etc.). For this reason, the wide ap-
plication of predictive technologies based on these new cate-64 See above fn. 21. 
65 On the limits of an approach focused on induvial rather than on 
the collective dimension, see Walker (n 27), 21 (“Combatting dis- 
crimination is not simply a matter of prohibiting acts of discrimi- 
nation or discriminatory legislation, but also entails an obligation 
on the State to take action to reverse the underlying biases in so- 
ciety that have led to discrimination and, where appropriate, take 
temporary special measures in favour of people living in disadvan- 
taged situations so as to promote substantive equality”). See also 
Eric J. Mitnick, Rights, Groups, and Self-Invention : Group-Differentiated 
Rights in Liberal Theory (Routledge, 2018); Robert P. George, ‘Individ- 
ual rights, collective interests, public law, and American politics’ 
(1989) 8 Law and Philosophy 245–261. 
66 For example, based on previous experiences, discrimination is 
primarily considered within the traditional categories (sex, reli- 
gion, etc.), see e.g. Recital 71 of the GDPR on automated decision- 
making, which refers to “discriminatory effects on natural persons 
on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or 
beliefs, trade union membership, genetic or health status or sex- 
ual orientation”. However, groups shaped by analytics and AI differ 
from the traditional notion of groups in the sociological sense of 
the term considered by the legislation: they have a variable geom- 
etry and individuals can shift from one group to another. 
67 These categories, used in discriminatory practice, are to a large 
extent the special categories mentioned in the data protection reg- 
ulations. gories and their use in decision-making processes suggests a
broader notion 68 of discrimination.69 
Additionally, the nature of the groups created by data-
intensive applications poses challenging issue from the pro-
cedural viewpoint, which concern the potential remedies
to the need for collective representation in the context of
algorithmic-created groups.70 Indeed, people belonging to
groups that are the traditional targets of discriminatory prac-
tices are aware of their membership of these groups and theyto receive the company’s best rates . The system considered as a 
negative factor driving late at night but did not take into account 
the potential bias against low-income individuals, who are more 
likely to work night shifts, compared with late-night party-goers, 
“forcing them [low-income individuals] to carry more of the 
cost of intoxicated and other irresponsible driving that happens 
disproportionately at night”, see David Robinson, Harlan Yu and 
Aaron Rieke, ‘Civil Rights, Big Data, and Our Algorithmic Future. 
A September 2014 report on social justice and technology’ (2014), 
18–19 < http://bigdata.fairness.io/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/ 
Civil _ Rights _ Big _ Data _ and _ Our _ Algorithmic-Future _ 2014- 09- 12. 
pdf> accessed 10 March 2018. Finally, commercial practices may 
lead to price discrimination or the adoption of differential terms 
and conditions depending on the assignment of consumers 
to a specific cluster. Thus, consumers classified as “financially 
challenged” belong to a cluster “[i]n the prime working years of 
their lives […] including many single parents, struggl[ing] with 
some of the lowest incomes and little accumulation of wealth”. 
This implies the following predictive viewpoint, based on big 
data analytics and regarding all consumers in the cluster: “[n]ot 
particularly loyal to any one financial institution, [and] they feel 
uncomfortable borrowing money and believe they are better off 
having what they want today as they never know what tomorrow 
will bring”, see Federal Trade Commission. 2014. Data Brokers: 
A Call for Transparency and Accountability. https://www.ftc.gov/ 
system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency- 
accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/ 
140527databrokerreport.pdf (accessed February 27, 2018), 20. It is 
not hard to imagine the potential discriminatory consequences 
of similar classifications with regard to individuals and groups. 
70 See also Mantelero, ‘Regulating Big Data (n 7). 
764 computer law & security review 34 (2018) 754–772 
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77 See The Danish Institute for Human Rights (n 27) 39–124. 
78 See below Section 3.1 . 
79 See EDPS - Ethics Advisory Group (n 12) and Council of 
Europe-Committee of experts on internet intermediaries (MSI- now or may know the other members of the group. On the 
ontrary, in the groups generated by algorithms, people do not 
now the other members of the group and, in many cases, are 
ot aware of the consequences of their belonging to a group.
ata subjects are not aware of the identity of the other mem- 
ers of the group, have no relationship with them and have a 
imited perception of their collective issues. 
Hard law remedies in this field may be not easy to achieve 
n the short run and the existing or potential procedural rules 
ften vary from one legal context to another.71 In this scenario,
 voluntary assessment procedure may represent a valid alter- 
ative to address these challenges. For these reasons, a model 
ased on a participatory approach and in which human rights 
re seen through the lens of ethical and social values may pro- 
ide broader safeguards both in terms of the interests taken 
nto account and the categories of individuals engaged in the 
rocess. 
Providing a framework for a societal impact assessment 
f data-intensive applications is in line with the ongoing 
ebate on Responsible Research Innovation 72 and the de- 
ands of the data industry and product developers for prac- 
ical tools to help them address the social issues of data use.
ools that can be more flexible open to new emerging values,
asily reshaped and applicable in different legal and cultural 
ontexts when built into self-assessment models. 
.1.3. Human rights impact assessment in data processing 
he Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA) adopted in 
usiness 73 is a third-party assessment based on data collec- 
ion and interviews with management, stakeholders and ex- 
erts, which may take several months to carry out. This as- 
essment is not focused on a specific process, but the bulk of 
he activities 74 carried out by a company in one or more coun- 
ries.75 On the other hand, the PIA and DPIA models concern 
 given data processing operation or, at least, may address a 
et of similar operations that present similar risks.76 71 See, e.g., the case of redress procedures to safeguard con- 
umers’ rights. 
72 See Jack Stilgoe, Richard Owen, and Phil Macnaghten. ‘Develop- 
ng a Framework for Responsible Innovation’ (2013) 42(9) Research 
olicy 1568–1580. 
73 See e.g. United Nations, Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
ights (United Nations, 2011) < http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ 
ublications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR _ EN.pdf> accessed 27 
pril 2018. 
74 See e.g. LKL International Consulting Inc., ‘Human Rights 
mpact Assessment of the Bisha Mine in Eritrea 2015 Audit’ 
2015) < https://nevsuncsr.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ 
isha- HRIA- Audit- 2015.pdf> accessed 27 April 2018; Tulika 
ansal and Yann Wyss, Talking the Human Rights Walk: Nestlé’s 
xperience Assessing Human Rights Impacts in its Business Activities 
Danish Institute for Human Rights and Nestlé, 2013) < http: 
/www.nestle.com/asset-library/documents/library/documents/ 
orporate _ social _ responsibility/nestle- hria- white- paper.pdf> ac- 
essed accessed 27 April 2018; On Common Ground Consultants 
nc., ‘Human Rights Assessment of Goldcorp’s Marlin Mine’ (2010) 
 http://csr.goldcorp.com/2011/docs/2010 _ human _ full _ en.pdf> 
ccessed 27 April 2018. 
75 See e.g. the short description of the HRIAs by different compa- 
ies in The Danish Institute for Human Rights. (n 27) 12–15. 
76 See Article35.1, GDPR. See also Article 29 Data Protection Work- 
ng Party (n 11) 7. 
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cThe different scale of HRIA and PIA/DPIA does not rule out 
doption of the HRIA approach – in terms of values and par- 
icipatory model – in data protection and for the assessment 
f single processing operations. On the other hand, the focus 
n a specific process tends to scale down HRIA complexity.77 
ere, the data intensive and (third party) expert-based model 
dopted by HRIA is replaced by a self-assessment tool, which 
s grounded on the same principles and rights as the HRIA 
ut is primarily aimed at data controllers. These may perform 
his assessment autonomously or with the support of an ad 
oc committee,78 which may be a permanent body supporting 
ifferent assessment operations and their reviews. 
Taking this approach, the participative method used in 
RIA is also part of the HRESIA model in the sense that the
elf-assessment tool (questionnaire), or the ad hoc committee,
elp the data controller identify potential stakeholders and 
nvolve them in a participatory process. The proposed model 
herefore scales down the HRIA framework. The broader reach 
f the HRIA means that stakeholders’ engagement cannot be 
een as a mere opportunity, while – in the case of HRESIA –
 single data processing operation may have a limited impact 
nd this kind of third-party engagement may be superfluous. 
Moreover, the wide array of business operations scruti- 
ised in the HRIA is more likely to have an impact on a va-
iety of human rights, whereas single data processing activ- 
ties affect a more limited range of rights. In this sense, – as 
onfirmed by ongoing studies in this field 79 – it is possible 
o point out the major role played by the principle of non- 
iscrimination 80 (Article 2, UN Universal Declaration of Hu- 
an Rights) and the right to privacy and private life (Article 12,
DHR). However, freedom of movement 81 (Article 13, UDHR),ET) (n 29). See also The White House, Executive Office of 
he President, ‘Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Val- 
es’ (2014) < https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/ 
les/docs/big _ data _ privacy _ report _ may _ 1 _ 2014.pdf> accessed 11 
ovember 2017. 
80 See, e.g., Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italian 
PA), 11 January 2007, doc. web n. 1381620; Commission de la pro- 
ection de la vie privée, raccomandation (Belgian DPA), 18 March 
009, n. 01/2009. See also Information Commissioner’s Office, 
The employment practices code’ (2011) and ‘The employment 
ractices. Code Supplementary Guidance’ (2005) < https://ico.org. 
k/for- organisations/guide- to- data- protection/employment/ > 
ccessed 16 April 2018. 
81 See, e.g., Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Lib- 
rtés, 21 June 1994, deliberation n. 94-056; Commission Nationale 
e l’Informatique ed des Libertés, 23 November 2013, deliberation 
. 2013-366; Commission Nationale de l’Informatique ed des Lib- 
rtés, 16 March 2006, deliberation n. 2006-066 ; Garante per la pro- 
ezione dei dati personali, 8 September 2016, doc. web n. 5497522; 
arante per la protezione dei dati personali, 18 May 2016, doc. 
eb n. 5217175; Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, 7 
arch 2013, doc. web n. 2471134; Garante per la protezione dei 
ati personali, 24 May 2017, doc. web n. 6495708; Garante per la 
rotezione dei dati personali, 15 June 2017, doc. web n. 6697925; 
arante per la protezione dei dati personali, 8 January 2015, doc 
eb n. 3723437); Commission de la protection de la vie privée, rac- 
omandation n. 03/2013, 24 April 2013; Commission de la protec- 
computer law & security review 34 (2018) 754–772 765 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 freedom of thought (Article 18 UDHR), as well as freedom of
expression 82 (Article 19 UDHR) and the right to education 83
(Article 26 UDHR) are also relevant in assessing the impact of
data use in different contexts. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that focusing the risk
assessment on human rights allows for a universal model,
which is unaffected, in its core values, by the variation in ap-
proaches to data protection in different geographical areas. At
the same time, as described below, this universal approach
should not underestimate the local dimension of the social
issues 84 and the varying nuances in the safeguards to funda-
mental rights and freedoms in different contexts, including
the balancing of competing interests. 
2.1.4. From HRIA to HRESIA 
Shifting the focus from data protection alone to human rights
represents an important step in addressing the complexity of
today’s data-intensive and AI applications. However, the hu-
man rights-based approach does have its limitations, due to
its historical origin and theoretical framework. 
As mentioned above,85 the conceptualization of these
rights is based on past experience and threats to human dig-
nity and freedom, as well as individual equality. For exam-
ple, the principle of non-discrimination mainly focused on
the conditions that are traditionally crucial in discrimina-
tory practices (e.g. race, colour, sex, language, religion, polit-
ical opinions), while the current algorithmic discrimination
is based on blurrier, less clear-cut categories. This may maketion de la vie privée, raccomandation n. 05/2010 del 15 December 
2010; Commission de la protection de la vie privée, raccomanda- 
tion n. 01/2010 del 17 March 2010 ; Agencia Española de Protec- 
ción de Datos, Resolución R/01208/2014; Agencia Española de Pro- 
tección de Datos expediente n. E/02778/2010; Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos, Expediente n. E/02689/2012. See also Informa- 
tion Commissioner’s Office, ‘In the picture: A data protection code 
of practice for surveillance cameras and personal information’ 
(2017) < https://ico.org.uk/media/1542/cctv- code- of- practice.pdf> 
accessed 13 April 2018. 
82 See, e.g., Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, 8 mag- 
gio 2013, n. 230, doc. web n. 2433401; Commission de la protection 
de la vie privée, 12 April 2006, avis, n. 8/2006; Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos, Gabinete Juridico, Informe 0464/2013; Agen- 
cia Española de Protección de Datos, Gabinete Juridico, Informe 
0292/2010. 
83 See, e.g., Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, 8 May 
2013, doc. web n. 2433401; Commission de la protection de la vie 
privée, 12 April 2006, avis, n. 8/2006. 
84 On this tension between universalist and context-dependent 
approach in social impact assessment, see Antonio Aledo-Tur 
and Andrés J. Domínguez-Gómez, ‘Social Impact Assessment (SIA) 
from a Multidimensional Paradigmatic Perspective: Challenges 
and Opportunities’ (2017) 195 Journal of Environmental Manage- 
ment 56–61; Deanna Kemp and Frank Vanclay, ‘Human rights and 
impact assessment: clarifying the connections in practice’ (2013) 
31(2) Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 86, 92. See also, 
with regard to Big Data and AI, Council of Europe (n 9), Section IV, 
para 1.2 (“Personal data processing should not be in conflict with 
the ethical values commonly accepted in the relevant community 
or communities and should not prejudice societal interests, values 
and norms, including the protection of human rights”); The IEEE 
Global Initiative for Ethical Considerations in Artificial Intelligence 
and Autonomous Systems (n 23) 24. 
85 See above para 2.1.3. a HRIA based on this traditional notion of human rights less
effective. 
Moreover, human rights are largely safeguarded as individ-
ual rights, while Big Data and AI are often no longer primarily
interested in the individual dimension and focus on groups
and the collective level.86 For this reason, it is necessary to
address the societal consequences of data-intensive applica-
tions, such as predictive policing or healthcare analytics. 
Additionally, data-intensive application may not necessar-
ily be against the law and may pass a human rights assess-
ment. However, this does not rule out that they may raise eth-
ical and societal concerns, for example in terms of unforeseen
bias or social acceptability (e.g. invasive or massive use of bio-
metric data based on data subjects’ consent), which cannot be
left unaddressed. 
These limitations concerning the safeguarding of the col-
lective dimension of data protection lead us to consider so-
cietal and ethical issues in the HRIA. Moreover, ethical and
social issues are not disconnected from legal assessment in
this field. Data protection laws adopt general principles (e.g.
fairness or proportionality) and general clauses (e.g. neces-
sity, legitimacy 87 ) which are used to introduce non-legal so-
cial values into the legal framework. Similarly, legal scholars
have highlighted how the application of human rights is nec-
essarily affected by social and political influences that are not
explicitly formalised in court decisions.88 See above fn. 21. 
87 See Bygrave (n 42) 61–63 and 339 on processing data for legiti- 
mate purpose (“solid grounds exist for arguing that the notion of 
‘legitimate’ denotes a criterion of social acceptability, such that 
personal data should only be processed for purposes that do not 
run counter to predominant social mores […] The bulk of data pro- 
tection instruments comprehend legitimacy prima facie in terms 
of procedural norms hinging on a criterion of lawfulness […] Very 
few expressly operate with a broader criterion of social justifica- 
tion. Nevertheless, the discretionary powers given by some na- 
tional laws to national data protection authorities have enabled 
the latter to apply a relatively wide-ranging test of social justi- 
fication”). See also New South Wales Privacy Committee, ‘Guide- 
lines for the operations of personal data systems’ (1977) < http:// 
www.rogerclarke.com/DV/NSWPCGs.pdf> accessed 13 April 2018; 
Michael Kirby, ‘Transborder Data Flows and the ‘Basic Rules’ of 
Data Privacy’ (1981) 16 Stanford J. of Int. Law, 27–66. 
88 See De Hert (n 27); Nardell, Gordon, ‘Levelling Up: Data Pri- 
vacy and the European Court of Human Rights’ in Serge Gutwirth, 
Yves Poullet and Paul De Hert (eds) Data Protection in a Pro- 
filed World (Springer, 2010) 43–52; Yutaka Arai-Takahashi and 
Yutaka Arai, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Princi- 
ple of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersen- 
tia, 2002); van Drooghenbroeck. (n 57); Evans, Carolyn, and Si- 
mon Evans, ‘Evaluating the Human Rights Performance of Leg- 
islatures’ (2006) 6(3) Human Rights Law Review 545–570; Centre 
for European Policy Studies, ‘Global Data Transfers: The Human 
Rights Implications’ (2010) < https://www.ceps.eu/publications/ 
global- data- transfers- human- rights- implications > accessed 13 
November 2017; Steven Greer, The margin of appreciation: interpre- 
tation and discretion under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Editions du Conseil de l’Europe, 2000); David Harris and others, 
Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press, 2014); Paul De Hert, ‘Balancing security and liberty within 
the European human rights framework. A critical reading of the 
Court’s case law in the light of surveillance and criminal law en- 
766 computer law & security review 34 (2018) 754–772 
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92 Access to information is both a human right per se and a key From this perspective, a HRESIA may be used to unveil the 
xisting interplay between the legal and the societal dimen- 
ions,89 making it explicit and mitigating the limitations of the 
RIA approach. It is important to reveal this cross-fertilization 
etween law and society, without allowing it to slip between 
he lines of the decisions of the courts, DPAs or other bodies.
n this sense, providing a model that also considers the so- 
ial and ethical dimensions helps to democratise assessment 
rocedures, removing them from the exclusive hands of the 
ourts, mediated by legal formalities. 
Indeed, although the courts, DPAs and legal scholars are 
ware of the influence of societal issues on their reasoning, it 
s frequently not explicit in the decisions they adopt in data 
rotection. Product developers are therefore unable to grasp 
he real sense of the existing provisions. Stressing the societal 
alues that should be taken into account in the human rights 
ssessment helps developers carry out self- assessments of 
he potential and complex negative consequences, from the 
arly stages of product design. 
Some may argue that one potential shortcoming of the 
roposed approach concerns the fact that, in the end, it in- 
roduces a paternalistic approach to data protection. In this 
ense, a HRESIA model necessarily encourages data con- 
rollers to exclude certain processing operations due to their 
thical or social implications, even if some individual data 
ubjects may take a different view and consider them in line 
ith their own values. The model may therefore be seen as a 
imitation on self-determination, indirectly affecting and re- 
ucing the range of available data use. 
The main pillar of this argument concerns the data sub- 
ect’s self-determination, but this notion is largely under- 
ined by today’s Big Data and AI-driven data processing.90 
he lack of knowledge and awareness in making decisions 
ith regard to data processing, on the one hand, and the fre- 
uent lack of effective freedom of choice (due to social, eco- 
omic and technical lock-ins), on the other, argue for a slightly 
aternalistic approach as a way to compensate these limita- 
ions on individual self-determination.91 
Moreover, HRESIA is not a standard but a self-assessment 
ool. It aims to provide data controllers with a better aware- 
ess of the human rights, ethical and social implications of 
ata processing that they should address. Data controllers re- orcement strategies after 9/11’ (2005) 1(1) Utrecht Law Review 68–
6. 
89 HRIA has its roots in the Social Impact Assessment (SIA) mod- 
ls. See Walker (n 27), 5. Nevertheless, due to the existing inter- 
lay between human rights and social and ethical values, it is hard 
o define this relationship as derivation, as human rights notions 
ecessarily affected the values adopted in SIA models. For exam- 
le, the International Association for Impact Assessment Princi- 
les refers to Article 1 of the UN Declaration on the Right to Devel- 
pment by which every human being and all peoples are entitled 
o participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural 
nd political development. 
90 See Mantelero ‘The future of consumer data protection in the 
.U.’ (n 7). 
91 See also Bygrave (n 42) 86 (“Under many European data pro- 
ection regimes, paternalistic forms of control have traditionally 
redominated over participatory forms, though implementation 
f the EC Directive changes this weighting somewhat in favour of 
he latter”). 
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Aain free to decide whether and how to address them and to 
ut in place participatory models to give voice to data subjects.
Finally, the publicity surrounding the HRESIA (in line 
ith the HRIA) may help to reinforce data subjects’ self- 
etermination, as it makes explicit the implications of a cer- 
ain data processing operation and fosters users’ informed 
hoice. Publicity increases not only the data subject’s aware- 
ess, but also the data controller’s accountability and is con- 
istent with a human rights approach.92 
There are cases in which full disclosure of the assessment 
esults may be limited by the legitimate interests of the data 
ontroller, such as confidentiality of information, security and 
ompetition. For example, the Guidelines on Big Data adopted 
y the Council of Europe in 2017 93 – following the sugges- 
ions of legal scholars 94 – specify that the results of the as- 
essment proposed in the guidelines “should be made publicly 
vailable, without prejudice to secrecy safeguarded by law. In 
he presence of such secrecy, controllers provide any confiden- 
ial information in a separate annex to the assessment report.
his annex shall not be public but may be accessed by the su-
ervisory authorities”.95 
The HRESIA and the SIA (Social Impact Assessment) have 
 similar focus on societal issues and the collective dimen- 
ion.96 They also share an interest in public participation, indi- 
idual and group empowerment through the assessment pro- 
ess, non-discrimination, equal participation in the assess- 
ent, focus on a range of different issues, accountability and 
 circular architecture. Since the model proposed sets out to 
mbed social and ethical issues in the HRIA, it is worth point- 
ng out the differences between the HRESIA and the EtIA/SIA 
odels. 
The main differences concern their rationale, the extent of 
he assessment and the way that the different interests are 
alanced in the assessment. The HRESIA aims to provide a 
niversal tool, which, at the same time, takes into account the 
ocal dimension of the safeguarded interests. In this sense, it is 
ased on a common architecture grounded on intentional in- 
truments with normative strength (charters of fundamental 
ights). The core of the architecture is represented by human rocess principle of HRIA. 
93 See above fn. 9. 
94 This is a critical aspect, because of the need to balance the 
ransparency of data processing with security and firms’ compet- 
tiveness. It is possible to provide business-sensitive information 
n a separate annex to the impact assessment report, which is not 
ublicly available, or publish a short version of the report with- 
ut the sensitive content. See Alessandro Mantelero, ‘Competitive 
alue of data protection: the impact of data protection regulation 
n online behaviour’ (2013) 3(4) Int’l Data Privacy L. 234; Neil M. 
ichards and Jonathan H. King, ‘Three Paradoxes of Big Data’ (2013) 
6 Stan. L. Rev. Online 41, 43; Wright (n 8) 222. 
95 Council of Europe (n 9), Section IV, para 3.3. See also Selbst (n 
5) 190. 
96 See Frank Vanclay and others, Social Impact Assessment: Guid- 
nce for assessing and managing the social impacts of projects (Interna- 
ional Association for Impact Assessment, 2015) < http://www.iaia. 
rg/uploads/pdf/SIA _ Guidance _ Document _ IAIA.pdf> accessed 26 
pril 2018; Walker (n 27), 39–42. 
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 rights, which also play a role in the SIA models but are not
pivotal as they take a wider approach.97 
In fact, the greater extension of the SIA approach encom-
passes a wide range of issues,98 broad theoretical categories
and focuses on the specific context investigated.99 The solu-
tions proposed by the SIA models are therefore heterogeneous
and differ in different contexts,100 making it difficult to place
them within a unique framework, which – on the contrary – is
an essential requirement in the context of the global policies
on data use. 
By contrast, a model grounded on human rights 101 is
more closely defined and universally applicable. Moreover,
the scaled down human rights impact assessment proposed
offers a common standard without requiring the significant
effort of the SIA, which was designed for large-scale social
phenomena. Finally, HRESIA is necessarily a rights-based as-
sessment, in line with the approach adopted in data protec-
tion (PIA, DPIA), while both the SIA and the EtIA (Ethical Im-
pact Assessment) are risks/benefits models. 
Regarding the comparison between HRESIA and EtIA,102 
the considerations about SIA can be repeated in relation to
EtIA.103 Moreover, in the EtIA model, in the forms proposed in97 See, ex multis , Thomas Dietz, ‘Theory and method in social im- 
pact assessment’ (1987) 57(1) Sociol. Inq. 54–69; Nicholas C. Taylor, 
C. Hobson Bryan and Colin G. Goodrich, Social assessment: theory, 
process and techniques (Centre for Resource Management, Lincoln 
College, 1990); Henk A. Becker, ‘Social impact assessment’ (2001) 
128(2) Eur. J. Oper. Res. 311–321; Frank Vanclay, ‘Conceptualising so- 
cial impacts’ (2002) 22(3) Environ. Impact. Assess. 183–211; Henk A. 
Becker and Frank Vanclay (eds) The International Handbook of Social 
Impact Assessment. Conceptual and Methodological Advances (Edward 
Elgar, 2003); James Harrison, ‘Human rights measurement: Reflec- 
tions on the current practice and future potential of human rights 
impact assessment’ (2011) 3(2) J Hum Rights Prac. 162–187. 
98 See Burdge and Vanclay (n 28) 59 (“Social impacts include all so- 
cial and cultural consequences to human populations of any pub- 
lic or private actions that alter the ways in which people live, work, 
play, relate to one another, organize to meet their needs, and gen- 
erally cope as members of society”). See also Massarani, Drakos, 
and Pajkowska (n 28). 
99 In this sense, the ethical and social impact assessment is de- 
scribed as the outermost circle to which the PIA can be extended 
by Raab and Wright (n 21) 379–382. 
00 See also Jonas Svensson, Social impact assessment in Finland, 
Norway and Sweden: a descriptive and comparative study (The- 
sis, KTH Royal Institute of Technology 2011), 84 < http://urn.kb.se/ 
resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-86850 > accessed 27 April 2018. 
01 See Kemp and Vanclay (n 84) 90–91 (“Human rights impact as- 
sessment (HRIA) differs from SIA in the sense that it proceeds 
from a clear starting point of the internationally recognised rights, 
whereas SIA proceeds following a scoping process whereby all 
stakeholders (including the affected communities) nominate key 
issues in conjunction with the expert opinion of the assessor in 
terms of what the key issues might be based on experience in sim- 
ilar cases elsewhere and a conceptual understanding”). 
02 See also Ian Harris and others, ‘Ethical Assessment of New 
Technologies: A Meta-methodology’ (2011) 9(1) Journal of Informa- 
tion, Communication and Ethics in Society 49–64; Erin Kenneally, 
Michael Bailey, and Douglas Maughan. ‘A Framework for Under- 
standing and Applying Ethical Principles in Network and Security 
Research’ in Radu Sion and others (eds) Financial Cryptography and 
Data Security (Springer, 2010). 
03 See, e.g., with regard to stakeholders’ engagement Wright and 
Mordini (n 21) 397 (“One of the objectives of an ethical impact as- 
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1
1the context of data protection, there is a clearer link with the
principles already recognised in law,104 given the relationship
between ethics and law discussed above. However, the poten-
tial risk of a mere ethical assessment does create some overlap
between ethical guidance and legal provisions. 
Finally, EtIA relies on a list of quite broad principles.105 This
is consistent with the assessment of specific processes (e.g.
ethics committees involved in clinical trials) or, alternatively,
entire branches of technology. But, data controllers may find
it difficult to apply broad principles in practice faced with the
enormous number of different data-intensive projects devel-
oped each year by companies.106 
2.2. Advantages of the HRESIA approach and the limits 
of PIA/DPIA models 
The proposed assessment model can achieve positive results
in assessing the impact of data use for the various reasons
mentioned above, here briefly summarised: 
• The central role of human rights in HRESIA provides a uni-
versal set of values, which is the backbone of the model
making it suited to various legal and social contexts. 
• The HRESIA is necessarily a principle-based model, which
makes it better at dealing with the rapid change of techno-
logical development, less easily addressed by detailed sets
of provisions. 
• The proposed model follows in the footsteps of the data
protection assessments, as a rights-based assessment in
line with the PIA and DPIA approaches. In this sense, the
HRESIA can be classed an ‘integrated’ model since it in-
tegrates human rights into DPIA and social assessment.
However, the HRESIA is not a multilayer assessment, but
rather a human rights impact assessment in which the
ethical and social dimensions serve to better understandsessment is to engage stakeholders in order to identify, discuss 
and find ways of dealing with ethical issues arising from the de- 
velopment of new technologies, services, projects or whatever”). 
04 See Wright and Mordini (n 21) 399 (“With specific regard 
to values, it draws on those stated in the EU Reform Treaty, 
signed by Heads of State and Government at the European Coun- 
cil in Lisbon on 13 December 2007, such as human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, human right protection, pluralism, non- 
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and gender equal- 
ity”). See also Ingrid Callies and others, ‘Outline of an Ethics As- 
sessment Framework’ (2017) 31 < http://satoriproject.eu/media/ 
SATORI- FRAMEWORK- 2017- 05- 03.pdf> accessed 27 April 2018. 
For broader analysis of ethical issue in risk assessment, see also 
Lotte Asveld and Sabine Roeser (eds) The Ethics of Technological Risk 
(Earthscan, 2009). 
05 See also SATORI project (n 40) 13–14 and 18–19 < http: 
//satoriproject.eu/media/CWA- SATORI _ part- 2 _ WD4- 20170510W. 
pdf> accessed 14 January 2018; Wright and Friedewald (n 21) 
760-762. 
06 See Callies et al. (n 104). See also Jules Polonetsky, Omer 
Tene and Joseph Jerome, ‘Beyond the Common Rule: Ethical 
Structures for Data Research in Non-Academic Settings’ (2015) 
13 Colorado Technology Law Journal 333–367; Consumer Privacy 
Bill of Rights, §103(c) (Administration Discussion Draft 2015) 
< https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/ 
letters/cpbr- act- of- 2015- discussion- draft.pdf> accessed 14 Jan- 
uary 2018. 
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sand operationalise human rights in a given context, be- 
yond some theoretical limits of the human rights frame- 
work.107 As an assessment tool, it fosters the adoption of a 
preventive approach to product/service development from 
the earliest stages, favouring a focus on safeguards to 
rights and values, and a responsible approach to technol- 
ogy development. 
• By stressing ethical and social values, HRESIA makes ex- 
plicit the non-legal values that inform the courts and DPAs 
in their reasoning when they apply general principles of 
data protection, interpret general clauses or balance con- 
flicting interests. 
• In considering ethical and social issues, this model makes 
it possible to give flexibility to the legal framework, going 
beyond its theoretical limits in dealing with of Big Data and 
AI applications. A human rights assessment that operates 
through the lens of ethical and social values can there- 
fore better address the challenges of the developing digital 
society. 
iven the above, it is worth pointing out the benefits of this 
odel in respect of the different PIA/DPIA standards adopted 
n several countries. The PIA models mainly focus on the indi- 
idual dimension of data protection 108 and ignore the ethical 
nd social issues.109 Moreover, in terms of safeguarded rights,
he main focus of the PIA concerns data protection, leaving 
ittle room for other fundamental rights and freedoms. In this 
ense, the Data Protection Impact Assessment adopted by the 
U legislator does not seem to significantly improve these 
orms of assessment, since the DPIA is a self-assessment com- 
ined with the potential control of the Supervisory Authori- 
ies.110 
Moreover, the DPIA only partially addresses the main is- 
ues and challenges associated with data use. The EU legis- 
ator, both in the Directive 95/46/EC and in the GDPR, intro- 
uces provisions that are primarily focused on data security 
nd data quality, without directly and broadly addressing the 
ifferent social and ethical issues of data use or providing 07 See above Section 2.2.. 
08 See Raab and Wright (n 21). 
09 See Wright and Mordini (n 21). 
10 The first stage (i.e. the DPIA) largely consists of an internal as- 
essment, whose results are not publicly available. In this regard, 
he guidelines provided by the Article 29 Data Protection Work- 
ng Party seem to be an attempt by the Supervisory Authorities 
o mitigate this shortcoming and encourage controllers to take 
n approach that is more oriented to the data subject’s engage- 
ent and transparent assessment. However, the weaknesses of 
he GDPR legal framework in terms of the participatory assess- 
ent and transparency of the DPIA, as well as the evident scarcity 
f Supervisory Authority resources illustrate how the compromise 
eached in the GDPR is a missed opportunity to adopt a stronger 
isk management model. For these reasons, despite the potential 
nes for infringement of GDPR requirements (Article 83), there is 
 real risk that, in various countries, many controllers will pre- 
er to underestimate the data processing risks and not seek prior 
onsultation with the Supervisory Authorities for their processing 
perations. 
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techanisms to measure the various adverse effects on indi- 
iduals and society.111 
For these reasons, a self-assessment model such as the 
RESIA may contribute to the evolution of the existing DPIA 
owards a more complete assessment model. From this per- 
pective the HRESIA can be seen as putting into practice the 
U legislator’s intention to safeguard not only the right to the 
ersonal data protection, but also the “fundamental rights and 
reedoms of natural persons”, as stated among the main aims 
f the Regulation 112 and the specific provisions on risk man- 
gement.113 
The HRESIA model also takes into account the social and 
ollective dimension, which is still not adequately addressed 
y the data protection regulation and only partially explored 
y legal scholars.114 Recital 75 of the GDPR describes the risk 
f a “significant economic or social disadvantage” because 
f data processing, but the GDPR and the DPIA models do 
ot elaborated further on the societal consequences of data 
rocessing. 
. The HRESIA architecture and its 
omponents 
his section describes the main elements of the HRESIA 
odel. This article is intended to put forward a blueprint and 
s such does not analyse these elements in depth or discuss 
he different related issues, but provides a general overview of 
he model, which will be discussed further in a future publi- 
ation drawing on this ongoing study. 
To combine the universal approach of human rights, the 
ocal dimension of social and ethical values and the tailored 
pplication of these complementary frameworks to a given 
ata processing operation the HRESIA model presents a three- 
ayer architecture. The first general layer is represented by the 
ommon values,115 i.e. human rights and related process prin- 
iples,116 whose relevance in the context of data protection 
hould be examined in light of the jurisprudence of the DPAs 
nd the courts.117 11 See Council of Europe (n 9), Section IV, para 2.3 (“Since the use 
f Big Data may affect not only individual privacy and data protec- 
ion, but also the collective dimension of these rights, preventive 
olicies and risk-assessment shall consider the legal, social and 
thical impact of the use of Big Data, including with regard to the 
ight to equal treatment and to non-discrimination”). 
12 See Article 1.2, GDPR. 
13 See e.g. Articles 24.1,25.1,32.1, 33.1.53.1, GDPR. 
14 See above fn. 21. 
15 See also Reuben Binns, ‘Algorithmic Accountability and Public 
eason’ (2017) Philosophy & Technology , 1–14 < https://link.springer. 
om/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs13347- 017- 0263- 5.pdf> accessed 12 
pril 2018 (on the role of public reason as a constraint in algorith- 
ic accountability) 
16 The human rights-based approach includes a number of 
process’ principles, namely: participation and inclusion, non- 
iscrimination and equality, and transparency and accountability. 
ee The Danish Institute for Human Rights (n 27) 35. 
17 Apart from the central role of privacy and data protection, a 
rst analysis of the decisions concerning data processing reveals 
he crucial role played by the principles of non-discrimination, 
ransparency and participation as well as the safeguarding of hu- 
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120 Stakeholders, different from groups directly affected by data 
processing, play a more relevant role in those contexts where di- 
rect consultation may put groups at risk, due to the law safeguards 
provided by local jurisdictions to human rights. See also Kemp and 
Vanclay (n 84) 92 (“For situations where direct consultation may 
put groups at risk, it may be necessary to engage third parties, such 
as NGOs or other agencies or individuals who have worked closely 
with particular groups. Assessment teams must be vigilant about 
ensuring that individuals and groups are not put at risk by virtue 
of the human rights assessment itself”). 
121 For a different approach to participation, more oriented to- 
wards participation of lay people in committees of experts – in the 
context of Technology Assessment, see Skorupinski and Ott (n 3) 
117–120. 
122 See also the following section. 
123 The role of participatory approaches and stakeholders’ en- 
gagement is specifically recognised in the context of fundamen- 
tal rights. See The Danish Institute for Human Rights (n 27) 24; De 
Hert (n 27) 72 (“Further case law is required to clarify the scope 
of the duty to study the impact of certain technologies and ini- 
tiatives, also outside the context of environmental health. Regard- 
less of the terms used, one can safely adduce that the current hu- 
man rights framework requires States to organise solid decision- 
making procedures that involve the persons affected by technolo- 
gies”). 
124 Participation of the different stakeholders (e.g. engagement 
of civil society and the business community in defining sectoral 
guidelines on values) can achieve a more effective result than 
mere transparency, although the latter has been emphasized in 
the recent debate on data processing. See The Danish Institute 
for Human Rights (n 27) 10 ("Engagement with rights-holders and The second layer is represented by the effect of the so-
cial and ethical values on the interpretation of these human
rights. These values represent the societal factors that in-
fluence the way the balance is achieved between the differ-
ent human rights and freedoms, in different contexts and
in different periods. Moreover, social and ethical values con-
cur in defining the extension of rights and freedoms, mak-
ing possible broader forms of protection when the regulatory
framework does not provide adequate answers to emerging
issues.118 
Finally, the third layer concerns the assessment of the
concrete case based on specific sets of rights, values and
principles. To operationalise this theoretical framework in an
assessment tool, the suggested model is composed of two dif-
ferent components: a HRESIA questionnaire and an ad hoc
committee (hereinafter HRESIA Committee). 
Since it is impossible to adopt a prescriptive approach
when assessing the impact of data use, data controllers must
consider the elements that are relevant in the specific case,
both in terms of data processing and its potential impacts. The
questionnaire therefore serves as a tool to support data con-
trollers in identifying the relevant human rights issues for any
given application along the lines of similar models adopted in
the field of data protection (PIA and DPIA). The questionnaire
embeds human rights principles and values and, depending
on the context, may also place them in a framework of the
local ethical and social values. 
The HRESIA committee assists in this contextualization
and moreover applies the HRESIA benchmark values to the
given case, balancing interests that may be in conflict, assess-
ing and mitigating the risks. Of course, where assessment is
easy the committee may be not necessary and data controllers
can assess the risks and mitigate them on their own using the
questionnaire alone. 
This blueprint does not intend to provide a list of ques-
tions to be adopted in the HRESIA model. It is part of an ongo-
ing research study 119 and the questionnaire must be carefully
drafted and tested further to validate the questions. However,
from a methodological perspective, the questionnaire can be
built based on the various existing HRIA, PIA and PDIA mod-
els, adapting them to the specific perspective of the HRESIA. It
should cover a range of areas concerning not only the variousman dignity, physical integrity and identity, as well as freedom of 
choice, of expression, of education, and of movement. These re- 
sults are part of an ongoing research programme on “Legal and 
regulatory issues of data processing and related social impacts”, 
see below in the section Acknowledgments. 
18 In order to absorb social values in the legal framework, a role 
can be played by the open clause that authorises restriction to 
fundamental rights when “necessary in a democratic society”, a 
limitation present in several articles of the ECHR and, including 
Article 8.2. See De Hert (n 27) 53-54. Anyway, also in this case a 
balance of interests in terms of proportionality is necessary, see 
European Court of Human Rights, S. and Marper v. The United King- 
dom , Judgement of 4 December 2008, Applications nos. 30562/04 
and 30566/04, § 125; see also Serge Gutwirth and Paul De Hert, 
‘Privacy, data protection and law enforcement. Opacity of the indi- 
vidual and transparency of power’ in Erik Claes, Antony Duff and 
Serge Gutwirth (eds) Privacy and the criminal law (Intersentia, 2006), 
91. 
19 See below Acknowledgement. human rights and freedoms relevant to data processing, but
also the procedural aspects of the participatory approach and
the disclosure of assessment results. 
Regarding the potential role of the participatory approach,
the results of the HRESIA may suggest the engagement of spe-
cific categories of individuals – giving voice to the different
groups of persons potentially affected by the use of data –
and other stakeholders 120 (e.g. NGOs, public bodies).121 The
same conclusion might follow from the advice of the HRESIA
Committee,122 which represents the second component of the
model. Moreover, this participatory approach 123 can also be
useful to get a better understanding of the different compet-
ing interests and ethical and social values.124 other stakeholders are essential in HRIA […] Stakeholder engage- 
ment has therefore been situated as the core cross-cutting compo- 
nent”). See also Walker (n 27), 41 (“participation is not only an end 
– a right – in itself, it is also a means of empowering communities 
to influence the policies and projects that affect them, as well as 
building the capacity of decision-makers to take into account the 
rights of individuals and communities when formulating and im- 
plementing projects and policies”). A more limited level of engage- 
ment, focused on awareness, was suggested by Council of Europe- 
Committee of experts on internet intermediaries (MSI-NET) (n 29) 
45 (“Public awareness and discourse are crucially important. All 
available means should be used to inform and engage the general 
public so that users are empowered to critically understand and 
deal with the logic and operation of algorithms. This can include 
but is not limited to information and media literacy campaigns. 
Institutions using algorithmic processes should be encouraged to 
provide easily accessible explanations with respect to the proce- 
dures followed by the algorithms and to how decisions are made. 
Industries that develop the analytical systems used in algorithmic 
decision-making and data collection processes have a particular 
responsibility to create awareness and understanding, including 
770 computer law & security review 34 (2018) 754–772 
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aFinally, stakeholder engagement is a development goal 
or the assessment,125 since it reduces the risk of under- 
epresenting certain groups and may also flag up critical is- 
ues that have been underestimated or ignored by data con- 
roller.126 
However, as has been pointed out in risk theory,127 stake- 
older engagement should not become a way for decision 
akers (data controllers, in this case) to avoid their respon- 
ibilities as leaders of the entire process. Decision makers re- 
ain committed to achieving the best results in terms of min- 
mising the potential negative impacts of data processing on 
ndividuals and society. 
.1. The role of expert committees in the HRESIA 
he increasing and granular availability of data about indi- 
iduals provided by IoT devices and online services enable 
rivate corporations to collect large amounts of data and 
se this to extract further information about individuals and 
roups. This has led private companies to carry out social 
nvestigations, which can be classed as research activities, tra- 
itionally carried out by research bodies. This raises new is- 
ues since private firms do not have the same ethical 128 and 
cientific background as researchers.129 
To address this lack of expertise, the literature has sug- 
ested the adoption of ethical boards, which may act at a 
ational level, providing general guidelines, or at a company 
evel, supporting data controllers with regard to specific data 
pplications.130 However, these proposals limit their focus 
o ethical issues on the one hand and on the other do not ith respect to the possible biases that may be induced by the de- 
ign and use of algorithms”). 
25 See also United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 
uman Rights, ‘Frequently asked questions on a human rights- 
ased approach to development cooperation’ (New York and 
eneva: United Nations, 2006). 
26 See Wright and Mordini (n 21) 402. 
27 See Elin Palm and Sven Ove Hansson, ‘The case for ethical tech- 
ology assessment (eTA)’ (2006) 73(5) Technological Forecasting & 
ocial Change 543, 550–551. 
28 See, e.g., Council of Europe, ‘Convention for the Protection of 
uman Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to 
he Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human 
ights and Biomedicine’ (1997); National Commission for the Pro- 
ection of Humans Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Re- 
earch, ‘Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the 
rotection of Human Subjects of Research’ (1979) < http://www. 
hs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html > accessed 
2 March 2018. 
29 See e.g. Stuart Schechter & Cristian Bravo-Lillo, ‘Us- 
ng Ethical-Response Surveys to Identify Sources of Dis- 
pproval and Concern with Facebook’s Emotional Conta- 
ion Experiment and Other Controversial Studies’ (2014) 
 http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/220718/CURRENT% 
0DRAFT%20- %20Ethical- Response%20Survey.pdf> accessed 
2 March 2018; Adam D. I. Kramer, Jamie E. Guillory & Jeffrey 
. Hancock, ‘Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional 
ontagion Through Social Networks’ (2014) 24 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 
 http://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/8788.full.pdf> accessed 12 
arch 2018. See also Ryan Calo, ‘Digital Market Manipulation’ 
2014) 82(4) Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 995, 1046. 
30 See Ryan Calo, ‘Consumer Subject Review Boards: A 
hought Experiment’ (2013) 66 Stan. L. Rev. Online 97 (2013), 
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Pituate these ethical boards within a broader framework of 
ights and values.131 Such shortcomings highlight the self- 
egulatory nature of these solutions lacking a strong general 
ramework that could provide a common baseline for data 
rocessing. 
On the other hand, the adoption of HRESIA committees 
ould build on the human rights framework outlined above 
epresenting a sound and common set of values to guide the 
ommittees’ decisions. HRESIA committees are not asked to 
efine the general ethical principles but, based on the HRE- 
IA questionnaire, contextualise these human rights and free- 
oms. 
In defining the status of these committees, the first issue 
oncerns their internal or external nature.132 This question 
s closely linked to their independence, which is vital if they 
re to be above the competing interests of the data controllers 
hose activities are assessed.133 
The main issue underpinning the internal/external nature 
f the HRESIA committees 134 therefore depends on the de- 
ree of independence they are allowed. In theory, they could 
e both internal and external, providing there are no conflicts 
f interests, which may occur more frequently with in-house 
ommittees, but cannot be excluded in the case of external 
ommittees. Best practice in the prevention of conflicts of in- 
erests should therefore be applied. 
As regard their function, the committee plays an impor- 
ant role in scaling down the complexity of traditional human 
ights impact assessment models. In this sense, the commit- 
ee experts (and the HRESIA questionnaire) replace empirical 
nalysis, which is required in the HRIA to define the assess- 
ent baseline in terms of the relevant rights and their local 
imension as framed by jurisprudence and local socio-ethical 
ssues. 
ttp://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy- and- big- data/ 
onsumer- subject- review-boards; Polonetsky, Tene and 
erome (n 106). See also White House, ‘Consumer Privacy 
ill of Rights’ §103(c) (Administration Discussion Draft 2015) 
 https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/ 
etters/cpbr- act- of- 2015- discussion- draft.pdf> accessed 12 
arch 2018; The IEEE Global Initiative for Ethical Considerations 
n Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems (n 23) 43-44, 
7, 49, 53. 
31 See, e.g., The Information Accountability Foundation, ‘Artifi- 
ial Intelligence, Ethics and Enhanced Data Stewardship’ (2017) 
 http://informationaccountability.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
rtificial- Intelligence- Ethics- and- Enhanced- Data- Stewardship. 
df> accessed 12 March 2018. 
32 The internal and external nature of the committees also de- 
ends on the availability of in-house skills and the costs of setting 
p an internal committee. See in this sense Polonetsky, Tene and 
erome (n 106) 354. 
33 See also Polonetsky, Tene and Jerome (n 106), 341, who point 
ut the consequences of this choice with regard to confidentiality 
f information (“On the other hand, advocates would not be sat- 
sfied with a process that is governed internally and opaque. The 
easibility of CSRBs thus hinges on the development of a model 
hat can ensure rapid response and business confidentiality while 
t the same time guaranteeing transparency and accountability”). 
34 Regarding other potential consequences of the different in- 
ernal/eternal nature of committees assessing data use, see also 
olonetsky, Tene and Jerome (n 106), 353–356. 
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 These tasks will obviously have an influence on the com-
position of the committees, since the people involved must be
able to carry out this kind of analysis. Legal expertise, an eth-
ical and sociological background, as well as domain-specific
knowledge (of the data application) is required. Moreover, the
composition and number of experts will also depend on the
complexity of data use. To offset the costs, permanent com-
mittees may be set up by groups of enterprises or serving all
SMEs in a given area. 
The quality of these committees and their work might
be enhanced by empowering the Data Protection Authorities
(DPAs) to supervise them. These authorities would not have to
authorise the creation of the committees or perform any prior
assessment of their compositions or activities, but data sub-
jects could ask the DPAs to scrutinize the committees when
shortcomings in their abilities or decisions affect the data
processing. 
The HRESIA committees’ main job is to consider the spe-
cific data use and place it in the local context, providing
a tailored and more granular application of the rights and
freedoms underpinning the HRESIA model. Committees may
therefore decide that this contextual application of general
principles and values requires the engagement of the groups
of individuals potentially affected by data processing 135 or in-
stitutional stakeholders. In this sense, the HRESIA is not a
mere desk analysis, but takes a participatory approach – as
described earlier 136 – which may be enhanced by the work of
the HRESIA committee. 
To guarantee the transparency and the independence of
the HRESIA committee and its deliberations, it should adopt
procedures to regulate its activity, also with regard to stake-
holder engagement. In addition, it should fully document its
decisional process and the documentation should be recorded
and archived for a specific period depending on the type of the
data use. 
Finally, given the self-assessment character of the HRESIA
model, the committees’ opinions are not mandatory for the
data controllers but help them to better assess the impact of
their data processing decisions. On the other hand, data con-
trollers may cite the committee’s conclusions in defending the
adequacy of their data processing decisions. Thus, the HRESIA
committee can play an indirect role in the data controller’s ac-
countability. 
4. Conclusions 
The increasing use of Big Data analytics and AI in decision-
making processes highlights the importance of examining
their potential impact on individuals and society at large. The
consequences of data processing are no longer restricted to
the well-known privacy-related issues, but encompass prej-
udices against groups of individuals and a broader array of
fundamental rights. Moreover, the tension between the exten-
sive use of Big Data and AI, on the one hand, and the increas-35 On the nature of these groups and its potential influence on the 
difficulty to engage them in the assessment, see also Mantelero, 
‘Personal data for decisional purposes’ (n 7). 
36 See the previous section. 
 
 
 
 ing demand for ethically and socially responsible data use
on the other, reveals the lack of a regulatory framework that
can address the societal issues raised by these data-intensive
technologies. 
Against this background, neither the traditional data pro-
tection impact assessment models (PIA and DPIA) nor the
broader social or ethical impact assessment procedures (SIA
and EtIA) appear to provide an adequate answer to the chal-
lenges of our algorithmic society. While the former have a nar-
row focus – centred on data quality and data security – the lat-
ter cover a wide range of issues, broad theoretical categories
and heterogeneous solutions. 
A human rights-centred assessment therefore offers a bet-
ter answer to the demand for a more comprehensive assess-
ment, including not only data protection issue, but also the
effects of data use on other fundamental rights and freedoms
(e.g. freedom of movement, freedom of expression, of assem-
bly and freedom in the workplace) and related principles (e.g.
non-discrimination). Moreover, a human rights assessment is
grounded on the charters of fundamental rights, which pro-
vide the common baseline for assessing data use required in
the context of the global data processing policy. 
The development of a self-assessment model based on hu-
man rights can contribute to the evolution of the existing DPIA
models towards a more complete assessment model. The pro-
posed Human Rights, Ethical and Social Impact Assessment
(HRESIA) is more closely aligned with the true intention of the
EU legislator to safeguard not only the right to personal data
protection, but also the fundamental rights and freedoms of
natural persons. Furthermore, attention to the ethical and so-
cial issues in the HRESIA model enables it to take into account
the social and collective dimension of data use, which is still
not adequately addressed by the data protection regulations
and only partially studied by legal scholars. 
Finally, ethical and social values, viewed through the lens
of human rights, make it possible overcome the limitations
of the traditional human rights impact assessment and help
to interpret human rights in a manner consistent with the
regional context. In this way, the HRESIA aims to provide a
universal tool that can take the local dimension of the safe-
guarded interests into account. 
To achieve these goals the HRESIA model includes a self-
assessment questionnaire in line with the traditional impact
assessment approach, and an ad hoc committee. These two
components make it possible to scale the complexity of the
human rights impact assessment down, defining the value
framework (questionnaire) and placing it in the context of the
local dimension, as well as providing a tailored and more gran-
ular application of the rights and freedoms underpinning the
HRESIA model. 
Based on this architecture, this assessment tool can raise
awareness among data controllers with respect to the impact
of their data processing choices on individuals and society. At
the same time, a participatory and transparent assessment
model like the HRESIA also gives data subjects an opportunity
for more informed choices concerning the use of their data,
and increases their awareness about the consequences of data
processing. 
Though this assessment may represent an additional bur-
den for data controllers, its voluntary self-assessment nature
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may encourage its diffusion in spheres where the data sub- 
ects pay greater attention to the ethical and social implica- 
ions of data use (healthcare, services/products for kids, etc.) 
r in the presence of socially oriented entities or developers’ 
ommunities. Moreover, as has happened in other sectors, a 
reater attention to human rights and societal impacts may 
epresent a competitive advantage for companies that deal 
ith responsible consumers and partners. 
Finally, the focus of policymakers, industry and communi- 
ies on ethics and responsible use of data, on the one hand,
nd the lack of adequate tools to assess the impacts of data 
rocessing on the fundamental rights and freedoms protected 
y legislators (e.g. GDPR), on the other, make the HRESIA a pos- 
ible solution in the direction of a broader consideration of the 
onsequences of data processing. 
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